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Summary 
The paper investigates the respective profitability of contractual arrangements, direct 
sales and spot marketing for “safe vegetable” farmers in Northern Vietnam. This is 
based on a survey of 137 peri-urban vegetable farmers, with a minimum of 30 farmers 
in each category. Selection biases are corrected using propensity score matching 
methods. The results show that direct sales have a positive significant impact on 
income relative to contractual arrangements and spot marketing when selection biases 
are corrected. Contractual arrangements have no significant impact on income 
compared with the other two categories after correction of selection bias. This may be 
due to the involvement of purchasers in the production process being still limited. The 
paper illustrates that direct relations between farmers and consumers, often described 
in the literature as efficient in the development of consumer confidence as regards 
quality, can indeed translate into higher incomes than anonymous exchange, or than 
contractual arrangements with retailing companies. Some limitations of the research 
and policy recommendations are given in the conclusion. 
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Economic impact of farmers-driven vertical integration: the case of 
safe vegetable chains in Northern Vietnam 
 
Introduction 
It is more and more widely acknowledged that access to high value chains have a 
positive impact on farmers’ incomes and poverty alleviation (World Bank, 2008). 
Rising incomes and fast urbanization increases the demand for high value products, 
including fruits, vegetables and meat. They are also increasing consumer attention to 
food safety. This context, combined with the liberalization of foreign direct 
investment, favored the development of supermarkets in developing countries, 
starting in the mid-1980s in Latin America and then rapidly spreading to Asia and 
Africa in the 1990s (Reardon et al., 2003).  
Like many countries of South-East Asia, Vietnam is characterized by a fast economic 
development and urban growth. The GDP growth rate was 8.5 per cent in 2007 (7.5 
for Laos and 4.8 for Thailand). In 2005, the urbanisation rate was 26.4 per cent and 
the urban growth rate stood at 3.13 per cent (Wup, 2009). Food safety has become of 
primary importance for urban consumers, especially for  vegetables, fruit and meat, 
together with the freshness of these products (Figuie et al., 2004). The growth rate of 
the value of the retail trade in USD is estimated at 10% per year for the period from 
2001 to 2006, and of modern trade by 20% per year in the same period. The share of 
supermarkets in retail market is nevertheless still limited (around 14 percent) (Usda, 
2009). Most of the food is still provided by retail wet markets, planned as well as 
spontaneous. 
On the supply side, Vietnam is characterized by a dynamic agricultural sector which 
still faces structural constraints. Most vegetables available in Hanoi are produced in 
peri-urban zones where the limited size of land, generally smaller than 500 m², and 
the context of property speculation, result in farmers using increasing quantities of 
fertiliser and pesticides to maximise productivity per hectare. In 1995, public interest 
in the safety of vegetable products led the Vietnamese Ministry of Agriculture to 
implement an ambitious programme called “safe vegetables”. The programme 
educated farmers in the reasonable use of fertiliser and pesticides, based on IPM 
principles as well as the use of water from wells and non-polluted rivers. Similar 
programmes were organized by NGOs. Some dynamic farmers established groups of 
neighboring farmers which benefited from the training, and engaged in various 
marketing strategies to promote their quality efforts. These include selling vegetables 
to canteens, shops or specific market stalls (with indication of vegetables being 
“safe”), and also to supermarkets. All these outlets offer premium prices to “safe 
vegetables”, although these are highly variable. Shops and market stalls may be run 
by intermediate traders, or by farmer groups themselves. Supermarkets commonly 
sign contracts with safe vegetable groups, or buy from distribution companies which 
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contract their supply to farmer groups. These contracts specify the frequency of 
delivery, quality requirements (including visual criteria and the provision of 
certificate) and terms of payment (cash, 15 to 30 days after delivery). Certificates of 
production of safe vegetables are awarded by the Plant Protection Department of 
Hanoi municipality. In 2008, in Hanoi there were twenty-seven cooperatives holding 
a certificate of safe vegetable production, representing around 2 per cent of Hanoi 
vegetable area (while the safe vegetable program approximately covers 20 per cent of 
area).  
Despite the growing demand for food safety, farmers frequently complain about the 
low profitability of vegetable production, and the strong variability of their incomes. 
Not all farmers are successful in finding traders providing premium prices to their 
vegetables. “Safe” vegetables can actually be sold through a variety of channels, in 
addition to the traditional chain of collectors, wholesalers and retailers. In some 
locations of peri-urban Hanoi, farmers have benefited from support by public 
programmes to get access to retailing points, or to contracts with distribution 
companies. In this paper, we address the following issue: what kind of vertical 
coordination is the most beneficial for farmers involved in quality efforts? 
Changes in consumer demand and in the retailing sector provide market opportunities, 
but also new challenges for small-scale farmers, as the new markets have special 
requests in terms of quality and timely deliveries. Contractual arrangements between 
farmers or farmer groups and buyers, and more generally vertical integration in the 
chain, have been documented as efficient ways to overcome these challenges and 
bring additional incomes to farmers. Vertical integration involves participation of one 
firm in two adjacent stages in the vertical marketing channel from producers to 
consumers, in terms of decisions and/or ownership (Carlton et Perloff, 1994). The role 
of vertical integration in reducing transaction costs has been brought to the fore by 
Williamson (1987). Transaction costs are all the indirect costs occurred in the setting, 
the conduct and the monitoring of the transaction, i.e., the information costs of 
searching, screening, agreeing, implementing and enforcing contracts (North, 1990). 
Measurement costs of quality characteristics are specific types of transaction costs.  
The safety of food products is a quality attribute which is especially difficult to 
observe and measure. The consequences of quality measurement constraints on the 
supply of low-quality products (as good quality products do not get quality premium) 
and even disappearance of market transactions have been demonstrated by Akerlov 
(1970). Increased vertical integration is a response to increasing quality measurement 
errors (Barzel, 1982).  
A typology of forms of coordination according to the degree of vertical integration 
can be found in various contributions of transaction costs economics including 
Williamson (1987) and Jaffee (1993). At two extremes lie market coordination and 
hierarchy (or firm). Market coordination generally refers to the coordination of 
operations of selling and purchase by the establishment and publicizing of prices, i.e. 
price incentives. The firm is a typical centralized, hierarchical organization, which 
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stands in contrast to classical market contracting. Hierarchy refers to the centralization 
of decisions, command-and-control approaches with coercive power translated into 
regulations. Hybrid forms are intermediary forms between markets and hierarchies, 
with some sharing of decisions between the two partners in the transaction. These 
include different forms of contracts. A contract can be defined as a set of 
commitments on the conditions of transactions, e.g., prices, volumes, quantities, input 
provision. Vertical integration increases from spot markets, market reciprocity, to 
contracts and hierarchy. Vertical integration reduces transaction costs, but on the 
other hand it increases governance costs, that is, costs of ensuring that the 
arrangements are enforced.  
Empirical tests relating contractual arrangements to the reduction of transaction costs 
are numerous (see in particular Shelanski and Klein, 1995  for a review). Besides, in 
the last ten years, studies measuring the benefits for farmers of contractual 
arrangements have developed.  A review of existing studies has been recently done 
by Miyata and al. (2009) showing the positive impact of contracts on farmers’ 
incomes. Yet, most existing studies compare incomes of farmers with and without 
contracts, and do not provide for selection biases related to differences in 
characteristics (observable and non observable) between farmers participating and not 
participating in contracts. These selection biases can be reduced by various 
econometric methods, including propensity score matching (PSM) (Rosenbaum et 
Rubin, 1983). This technique was used by Miyata and al (2009) in their study of 
contracts for marketing apples and green onions in Shandong Province in China. 
Their conclusion is that contract farmers earn more than their neighbors growing the 
same crops even after controlling for observable and non observable characteristics. 
Another rigorous evaluation (based on PSM techniques) of the economic impact of 
different modes of coordination in food chains was conducted by Maertens and 
Swinnen (2009) in the case of vegetable exports in Senegal. A comparison of incomes 
was conducted between farmers contracted with export companies, farmers employed 
by exporters’ estate farms and independent farmers. The study shows that contracted 
farmers earn more than vertically integrated farmers who themselves earn more than 
farmers outside export schemes (nor contracted nor vertically integrated). 
Yet it is difficult to conclude from this study that contractual arrangements bring 
additional incomes relative to spot marketing. What are compared are incomes from 
green beans exported (through contracts) with incomes of farmers not involved in 
contracts, so it is the introduction of a new crop rather than the form of coordination 
which generates additional incomes.  Besides, even when the same crops are 
considered, as is the case in the study by Miyata and al. (2009), the quality 
characteristics are different between the farmers selling through contracts and the 
ones without contracts, so that it is difficult to conclude about the impact of the 
contract versus the impact of quality upgrading. Finally, what would be interesting to 
compare is the effect of contractual arrangements versus other ways to coordinate 
transactions in a chain where specific quality attributes are involved, generating high 
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transaction costs. Existing studies mostly focus on vertical integration driven by the 
buyer, who provides inputs in exchange for the product purchase. Another possible 
situation of vertical integration is when farmers engage in retailing, which can be 
termed as farmers’ driven vertical integration. The case of safe vegetables in Vietnam 
provides a good ground for evaluating the impact of different types of vertical 
coordination. 
In the paper we will evaluate the impact on incomes of three different types of 
intra-chain coordination observed to market “safe” vegetables (defined as vegetables 
produced alongside IPM methods, be they certified or not): spot marketing, 
corresponding to marketing to collectors without commitments in terms of inputs or 
outputs; contractual arrangements with supermarkets; direct sales to consumers. Next 
section details the methodology used. 
 
 
Method 
Data collection  
We conducted a survey from August to December 2008 of 137 peri-urban vegetable 
farmers, situated in safe vegetable production areas. They market their vegetables through three 
ways: (1) selling to collectors in spot markets (66 farmers); (2) selling directly to consumers in 
rented shops or market stalls (30 farmers); (3) selling to supermarkets or to companies through 
contracts (41 farmers).  Besides we conducted interviews with the leaders of the nine farmer 
cooperatives where the farmers contracted or selling directly belong to better understand the 
specifications of the contracts and the strategies of the group as regards marketing. 
It should be noted that farmers frequently combine different marketing strategies. We 
selected farmers selling more than one half of their vegetables through one channel to define 
them as belonging to the three respective groups of market coordination (spot marketing, direct 
sales, contracts). This condition explains the small size of sample for situations (2) and (3). 
 Besides, supermarkets and companies contract with farmer organizations rather than with 
individual farmers. But the interviews with the cooperative leaders show that the contracts are 
fulfilled by a small number of farmers in the group (two to five) who sell their own products 
plus the products of some neighboring farmers. Likewise, the shops of the farmer cooperatives 
are run by a small group of farmers who sell their vegetables and act as collectors for the rest of 
the group. Hence the strategies of marketing are individual rather than collective. The 
collective pattern of the farmer organizations mostly relate to quality development and labeling 
(Moustier et al., 2010). 
The questionnaire provides details on household demographic characteristics, landholdings, 
planting pattern, inclusion in a group, vegetable production, household income, agricultural 
income from vegetable and non-vegetable production. As stated by Miyata and al. (2009), the 
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household income is a better indicator than vegetable income of the effect of the contract on the 
well-being because the contract may draw labour or land away from other activities. 
Data analysis 
Descriptive analysis was used to show and compare the basic household characteristics. To 
estimate the impact of different forms of coordination in vegetable chains, regression and 
matching techniques from the average treatment effects literature were applied to correct the 
selection bias resulted from stakeholders decision and output (Jalan and Ravallion, 2003; 
Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). Taking farmers with contract or selling directly to consumers as 
treatment group and farmers selling in spot market as control group in the study, the value of 
average treatment effects (ATE) is defined as the average difference between household 
income with and without treatment for those who actually participated in treatment. Two 
treatments are considered: contracts with companies, and direct sales. These treatments are 
applied to farmers independently from their characteristics, as they mostly depend on the 
location of farmers, and on the fact that they were the first selected ones from what can be 
approximated to a “queuing list”, as market stalls and shops are in a limited supply. Y1 and Y2 
represent the income with treatments and Y0 the income without treatment.   
)( 011 YYEATE   for  11T : with contract 
)( 022 YYEATE   for  12T : selling directly  
The hypothesis is with that vertical coordination whether in the form of contracts or direct 
sales treatment coordination have positive impact on household income and therefore both 
ATEs are positive significantly. Observable covariates related to participation and family 
income as output were selected from the survey for the selection bias adjustment (Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2009; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999; Heckman et al., 
1997). The result is shown in Table 1. They are farmers’ access to resources (including 
landholdings, labor and distance from nearest market), their skill and ability including age and 
education, and family preference identifying by family size. The number of motorbikes was not 
selected because of the potential endogenous problem although it is a typical variable in 
Vietnam to indicate their family assets. The number of motorbikes could be an endogenous 
variable related to income because it is difficult to identify whether farmers with higher income 
buy more motorbikes or more motorbikes help farmers increase the income by transportation 
and selling the products.  
To compare the impact of different forms of coordination and identify the selection bias, 
there are three components in the econometric analysis. First, we use the covariate matching 
method to implement the regression on household income and the selection bias was controlled 
by including observable covariates. Farmers’ participation is included as the covariates to 
estimate the average treatment effects. The ATEs can be estimated as the coefficients of 
covariates for treatment in the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Imbens, 2004; 
Wooldridge, 2002). The model I is specified as:  
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iii XTYTFor 222 :)1(  
Secondly, a probit model is used to estimate the probability of a given household 
participating in the treatment and the estimated marginal probabilities are included as 
additional propensity score correction functions in the regression (Maertens and Swinnen, 
2009). This is to control the participation bias correlated to unobservable characteristics. And 
the ATEs can be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2009; Imbens, 2004; Wooldridge, 2002).  
The model II is specified as:  
iii XPTYTFor 1111 :)1(  
iii XPTYTFor 2222 :)1(  
with )|1(
^
XTpP ii  
The third econometric analysis is to estimate ATEs using the propensity score matching 
method because the counterfactuals are never directly observed. Non experimental studies 
differ from randomized experiments in that the probability of participating in coordination is 
not a fixed constant but influenced by unobserved and observed characteristics due to 
self-selection and selection made by related stakeholders (Aakvik, 2001). Selection bias due to 
correlation between observed variables and a households’ participation is solved by either 
matching techniques or by including these covariates in regression analysis (Aakvik, 2001).   
As regards the model to be used for the estimation, there is little advice on functional form 
and logit and probit models usually yield similar results for bivariate estimation (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008; Smith, 1997), probit model was used in the propensity score matching 
analysis. We use the single nearest neighbor algorithm with replacement to identify the best 
match for each treated farmer which is the most straightforward matching method and reduces 
bias (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). The propensity score matching 
method estimates ATEs is specified as Model III:  
)(
1
1
1
1 ji
YY
N
ATE  
)(
1
2
2
2 ji
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N
ATE      
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Results    
Descriptive analysis  
 
Farm characteristics 
Characteristics of households selling directly to consumers and contracted by supermarkets 
or company are compared to those selling their vegetables in spot markets using T test (Table 
2).  The significant differences between the three groups relate to the following characteristics:  
the land area (largest for spot market, followed by contracts and direct sales); the distance from 
the nearest market (higher for direct sales than the other groups); the number of working 
persons (highest for spot market); the age (lower for contracted farmers than for the other 
groups); education level (highest for contracted farmers). 
Incomes 
The survey shows that the highest incomes are obtained for farmers selling directly to 
consumers, both as regards vegetable incomes and total household incomes.  Second come 
incomes of contracted farmers, followed by farmers selling in spot markets (see Figure 1).  
Vegetable production is an important income source for farmers, especially for the contract 
and direct sales groups farmers (more than half of the overall income), compared with less than 
one third of household income for those selling in spot markets. 
The following section investigates whether the differences in incomes result from the 
resource or location characteristics of households or from their participation in contract and 
vertical integration after correcting selection bias.  
Econometric analysis  
In table 3 we show the result of model I, covariate matching method, by implementing OLS 
regression to estimate the ATEs. The estimate effect for direct sales is significantly positive at 
the 1% level. Household income could be raised by 32.5 million VND by selling directly to 
consumers which accounts for 51% of the total average household income and 56% of 
household income selling in spot markets. In contrast, the estimation indicates that there is no 
significant impact of contract on household income after controlling a set of observable 
covariates.  
Taking the probability of a given household participate the treatment into account, Table 4 
shows the results of model II. Similar with the results of model I, the estimate effect for direct 
sales is significantly at the 5% level and no significant impact for contracts. And the extent of 
income increasing is 32.37 million VND, 50% of the total average household income and 56% 
of household income selling in spot markets which is quite close to that of model I. This 
confirms the hypothesis that the vertical integration of selling directly to consumers can help 
raise small farm income. In contrast, the estimated effects for contract are not significantly 
positive in the regression. 
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The result of the bivariate probit in Table 5 shows that selling directly to consumers is 
biased toward household with bigger household size, less labor and less land and that with 
contract is biased toward those younger households and with less land. There is no significant 
effect of education on the probability of different forms of coordination. The result further 
indicates that households with less land are more likely to be involved in safe vegetable 
production through contract or direct sales.  
After implementing the propensity score matching method to correct the bias, Table 6 shows 
the comparison of estimated treatment effect. Matching means the similar treatment and control 
units are paired in terms of their observable characteristics (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; 
Abadie and Imbens, 2002; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).  The result of the estimated effect for 
direct sales is still significantly positive at the 1% level with the difference about 42 million 
VND which is higher than that of model I and II.  
It is interesting that the estimate effect has significant impact for contracts which is different 
from that of model I and II. We present the result of comparison between and after match in 
Table 7, this indicates that there is possible selection bias before matching. And the null 
hypothesis that the previous matching techniques could avoid the selection bias is rejected. To 
make the results robust, we use “trimming” (Smith and Todd, 2005) to estimate the effect 
which impose the common support by dropping the treatment observations which has lowest 
propensity score density of the control observations. The results are the same. It confirms the 
hypothesis that contract farming can contribute to raising small farm income.  
Robustness tests 
The average treatment effect is only defined in the region of common support (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008). To estimate ATE requires sufficient overlap and region of common support 
between treatment and control group (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Imbens, 2004). ATE is 
difficult to be estimated by matching techniques if households with and without coordination 
differ substantially in observable characteristics (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009).  There are 
two methods to check the overlap and common support. One is by comparing the minima and 
maxima of the propensity score and the other one is based on estimating the density distribution 
(Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). We use the first and Figure 1 shows the comparison. It 
indicates the sufficient overlap and common support where the propensity score of the treated 
group is not higher than the maximum propensity score of control group or less than that of the 
minimum one. Besides, the results of Table 8 show that there is a strong bias for most 
covariates. And the matching eliminates the bias so that there is a good balance of covariate 
distribution between treated and matched control units.  
To test robustness and unmeasured bias, we also calculate Rosenbaum bounds for average 
treatment effects on the treated in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity (hidden bias) 
between treatment and control units and the results are shown in Table 9 and Table 10. The 
results suggest that the effects are still significant which corroborating the propensity score 
matching method.  
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Conclusion 
The results show the profitability of farmers’ direct sales relative to selling to collectors in 
spot markets, and even to contracts with supermarkets. Contracts with supermarkets actually 
show higher profitability than spot markets, but this does not appear significant after selection 
biases are corrected. 
Direct sales provide economic benefits to farmers translated into higher income, because they 
enable farmers to better promote their efforts in terms of vegetable quality, especially safety. 
Food safety generates a number of information deficiencies and opportunism risks which are 
reduced by cutting intermediary stages between farmers and consumers. This also benefits 
consumers who are reassured in terms of the way food is produced, in addition to getting 
access to fresher and more affordable food. Yet direct sales may be constraining in terms of 
the access to a market stall or store (Moustier et Nguyen, A paraître). 
The results are original because they show the profitability of vertical integration of retailing 
stages by producers, while many farmers rather investigate vertical integration of producing 
stages by traders. Yet some qualifications need to be made. The contracts observed in the safe 
vegetable chains have limited features of vertical integration. They are mostly systems of 
guarantee of purchase and sale, rather than the involvement of the purchaser in the stages of 
production. Purchasers do not provide inputs nor technical advice, and the extent of quality 
control is limited. It would be worthwhile to carry out a comparison of farmers-driven 
integration with retailer-driven integration in cases of more active involvement of retailers in 
the process of production, which may be more frequent in Southern Vietnam than in Northern 
Vietnam. Another situation is the one of retailing companies involved in production through 
salaried workers. The profitability of salaried work could be compared with the one of 
contracted and independent farmers – provided we could find a significant number of farmers 
in situation of salaried work.  
In terms of policy recommendation, our results indicate that public support for farmers to be 
able to directly sell their products could have beneficial impact on their incomes. This could 
involve micro-credit programmes, as well as facilitating the protection of areas available for 
farmers’ sales, including farmer retail markets, which are still missing in Vietnam, in contrast 
with other countries. Besides, public food safety control needs to be improved to make the 
label “safe vegetables” more credible. At the moment, there is no strict control by an external 
authority of the origin of vegetables sold in the stalls and shops; the latter may well mix 
vegetables from various production areas and with incomplete certification. This could 
jeopardize the reputation – and hence incomes - of farmers involved in quality efforts. 
The paper has some limitations and additional research is required. The issue of unobserved 
characteristics should be further investigated. Explanations should be further looked for as 
regards the unexpected direction of covariates. Besides, it would be worthwhile to carry out 
similar analyses with bigger samples per treatment, which would imply doing the research in 
other regions of Vietnam. 
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Table 1. Observable covariates for selection bias adjustment of ATEs  
 
Covariate 
 
Description  
 
Household 
income 
Selling 
directly to 
consumers 
Contract 
with SM 
and 
company 
Size  Household size  (persons) 0.435*** -0.166 -0.146 
Age  Average age of the family -0.133 -0.085 -0.200** 
Labor
a 
Household labor endowments 0.378*** -0.277*** -0.272*** 
Labor2 Square of labor  0.375*** -0.225** -0.268*** 
Education Average years of education in the family 0.141 -0.138 -0.211** 
Land  Arable land area (ha) 0.118 -0.387** -0.312*** 
Market Distance from nearest market (km) 0.121 0.239** -0.046 
Road  Distance from nearest road (km) 0.101 -0.056 -0.097 
a
People aged from 15 to 65 were taken as labor.  
 
13 
 
Table 2 Comparison of household characteristics for different coordination forms 
  
Total  
Selling in 
spot 
markets
 
Selling 
directly to 
consumers
c 
Contracted by 
supermarkets 
or company 
Number of households  137 66 30 41 
     
Household income (million VND) 64.24 57.93 81.42** 62.16 (*)
d 
Vegetable income (million VND) 29.38 19.03 44.32*** 35.09***  
Share of vegetable income (%) 45.96 36.23 56.22*** 54.27*** 
Agriculture income
a
 (million VND) 31.63 21.91 44.72*** 37.62*** 
Agri. income per hectare (million VND/ha) 185.13 102.90 292.47*** 238.09*** 
     
Household size  (persons)      4.47 4.71 4.17 4.29 
    Male  (persons) 2.31 2.47 2.13 2.20 
    Female (persons) 2.15 2.24 2.03 2.10 
Number of labor 
b 
3.48 3.86 3.07*** 3.17*** 
Share of labors in the family 80% 85% 75% 75% 
Age (years old) 34.58 36.22 34.32 32.13** 
Education (years) 8.36 8.76 8.10 7.84** 
     
Arable land area (ha) 0.22 0.26 0.16*** 0.18*** 
Distance from nearest market (km) 0.94 0.88 1.26** 0.81(***) 
Distance from nearest road (km) 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.21 
a 
Agriculture income only refers to farming on the arable land, not including livestock feeding.  
b
 Labor refers to a people in age from 15 to 65.  
c 
Characteristics of farmers selling directly to consumers and contracted by supermarkets or company 
are compared to those selling their vegetables in spot markets using T test. Significant differences are 
indicated with *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
d
 The significance level indicated in the bracket is the comparison between selling directly to 
consumers and contracts.  
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Table 3. Regression on covariates by implementing OLS regression to estimate ATEs. 
 T1: Selling directly T2: With contract 
 Coefficient Std. Err. t Coefficient Std. Err. t 
Contract  32.50*** 10.45 3.11 14.16 8.55 1.66 
Size  16.50*** 5.61 2.94 12.32** 4.84 2.55 
Age  0.07 0.43 0.17 0.13 0.37 0.35 
Labor 2.29 16.88 0.14 4.19 13.06 0.32 
Labor2 -0.23 1.93 -0.12 -0.18 1.77 -0.10 
Education  2.69 3.29 0.82 3.19 2.49 1.28 
Land  -54.87 43.68 -1.26 -27.60 39.32 -0.70 
Market  4.38 5.66 0.77 -0.70 4.93 -0.14 
_cons -40.46 43.95 -0.92 -38.12 38.13 -1.00 
 
Table 4. Regression on propensity score to estimate ATEs 
 T1: Selling directly T2: With contract 
 Coefficient Bootstrap 
Std. Err. 
t Coefficient Bootstrap 
Std. Err. 
t 
Contract 
(0=spot) 
32.37*** 11.53 2.81 13.84 8.36 1.65 
PS -26.73 88.01 -0.30 81.23 213.95 0.38 
Size  19.69 13.51 1.46 4.77 23.07 0.21 
Age  0.02 0.46 0.03 0.90 2.00 0.45 
Labor -10.10 45.75 -0.22 15.81 23.38 0.68 
Labor2 0.70 5.11 0.17 0.17 4.30 0.04 
Education  3.81 5.54 0.69 2.05 4.85 0.42 
Land  -89.11 126.72 -0.70 34.76 176.46 0.20 
Market  7.21 10.99 0.66 0.31 5.16 0.06 
_cons -18.40 84.73 -0.22 -111.48 171.34 -0.65 
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Table 5. Propensity score estimated using a bivariate probit model  
Treatment T1: Selling directly T2: With contract 
Covariate Coefficient Std.Err Coefficient Std.Err 
Size 0.129** 0.064 0.109 0.075 
Age -0.001 0.005 -0.009* 0.005 
Labor -0.451** 0.197 -0.040 0.235 
Labor2 0.032 0.023 -0.024 0.036 
Education 0.046 0.037 0.022 0.039 
Land -1.489*** 0.563 -0.868* 0.475 
Market 0.117* 0.060 -0.015 0.075 
 
Table 6. Regression on propensity score to estimate ATEs 
 T1: Selling directly T2: With contract 
 Coefficient Bootstrap 
Std. Err. 
t Coefficient Bootstrap 
Std. Err. 
t 
Contract 
(0=spot) 
32.37*** 11.53 2.81 13.84 8.36 1.65 
PS -26.73 88.01 -0.30 81.23 213.95 0.38 
Size  19.69 13.51 1.46 4.77 23.07 0.21 
Age  0.02 0.46 0.03 0.90 2.00 0.45 
Labor -10.10 45.75 -0.22 15.81 23.38 0.68 
Labor2 0.70 5.11 0.17 0.17 4.30 0.04 
Education  3.81 5.54 0.69 2.05 4.85 0.42 
Land  -89.11 126.72 -0.70 34.76 176.46 0.20 
Market  7.21 10.99 0.66 0.31 5.16 0.06 
_cons -18.40 84.73 -0.22 -111.48 171.34 -0.65 
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Table 7. T-test of household income before and after matching  
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
T1: Selling directly 
Income Unmatched 85.13 57.30 27.83 10.45 2.66 
 ATT 85.13 43.14 41.98 12.91 3.25 
Income Unmatched 85.12 57.30 27.83 10.45 2.66 
 ATT 82.20 43.46 38.73 12.88 3.01 
T2: With contract 
Income Unmatched 62.16 57.30 4.86 8.16 0.60 
 ATT 62.16 41.86 20.29 10.82 1.88 
Income Unmatched 62.16 57.30 4.86 8.16 0.60 
 ATT 64.13 41.78 22.35 10.45 2.14 
Table 8. Balancing properties of covariates in treated and control groups  
Variable Sample Mean %bias between 
treated and control 
% Reduction 
in bias 
Treated Control 
Treatment 1: Selling directly to consumers  
Size  Unmatched 4.16 4.64 -31.8  
 Matched 4.16 3.68 31.5 0.8 
Age  Unmatched 33.42 36.33 -27.0  
 Matched 33.42 39.57 -57.1 -111.7 
Labor  Unmatched 3.04 3.86 -61.1  
 Matched 3.04 2.88 11.9 80.6 
Labor2 Unmatched 11.20 16.51 -50.2  
 Matched 11.20 9.28 18.1 63.8 
Land  Unmatched 0.18 0.26 -80.7  
 Matched 0.18 0.19 -13.2 83.6 
Education Unmatched 8.03 8.81 -33.6  
 Matched 8.03 8.04 -0.5 98.5 
Land  Unmatched 0.18 0.26 -80.7  
 Matched 0.18 0.19 -13.2 83.6 
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Market  Unmatched 1.31 0.92 53.9  
 Matched 1.31 2.02 -98.6 -83.0 
Treatment 2: Contracted by supermarkets and companies 
Size  Unmatched 4.22 4.64 -30.3  
 Matched 4.22 4.84 -44.6 -46.9 
Age Unmatched 30.19 36.33 -62.0  
 Matched 30.19 28.55 16.5 73.3 
Labor  Unmatched 3.00 3.86 -71.9  
 Matched 3.00 3.00 0.00 100.0 
Labor2 Unmatched 10.25 16.51 -72.9  
 Matched 10.25 9.69 6.6 91.0 
Education  Unmatched 7.75 8.81 -50.5  
 Matched 7.75 7.31 21.0 58.3 
Land  Unmatched 0.17 0.26 -92.8  
 Matched 0.17 0.20 -34.1 63.3 
Market  Unmatched 0.74 0.92 -27.4  
 Matched 0.74 0.85 -17.1 37.5 
 
Table 9. Sensitivity analysis of propensity score matching for treatment of selling directly  
Gamma sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI- 
1 0.0028 0.0028 33.4615 33.4615 10.8850 64.6815 
1.05 0.0038 0.0020 32.1450 35.0430 8.7200 67.1815 
1.1 0.0051 0.0015 30.5743 36.2687 8.2392 68.4955 
1.15 0.0066 0.0011 29.6450 38.3380 7.0527 70.1925 
1.2 0.0083 0.0008 28.8010 39.1520 6.8575 72.0740 
1.25 0.0103 0.0006 27.5405 40.4125 5.5970 73.2605 
1.3 0.0126 0.0004 26.6473 42.0113 5.0900 74.5210 
1.35 0.0151 0.0003 26.3010 42.8063 2.9290 76.2785 
1.4 0.0180 0.0002 25.5227 43.8683 2.3612 77.8650 
1.45 0.0211 0.0002 23.8540 44.8565 1.3070 78.2275 
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1.5 0.0245 0.0001 23.5505 45.2380 0.6213 78.7930 
1.55 0.0282 0.0001 23.0060 45.5700 -0.4150 79.3465 
1.6 0.0322 0.0001 22.4965 47.2750 -1.6755 80.7275 
1.65 0.0365 0.0000 21.7455 48.0700 -2.0604 81.8299 
1.7 0.0410 0.0000 21.5366 49.3200 -3.1145 82.8840 
1.75 0.0458 0.0000 20.5590 49.7750 -3.8470 83.2275 
1.8 0.0508 0.0000 19.1625 50.5700 -4.7025 83.4900 
1.85 0.0561 0.0000 18.5373 52.3241 -5.1065 86.5580 
1.9 0.0616 0.0000 17.4130 52.4495 -6.3670 87.6810 
1.95 0.0674 0.0000 17.2410 53.5370 -6.6070 87.9583 
2 0.0733 0.0000 16.8149 54.6048 -7.5535 91.0263 
* gamma: log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors.  
  sig+: upper bound significance level.  
sig-: lower bound significance level 
  t-hat+: upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate.  
  t-hat-: lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
  CI+: upper bound confidence interval (a=0.95) 
  CI-: lower bound confidence interval (a= 0.95) 
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Table 10. Sensitivity analysis of propensity score matching for treatment of contracts  
Gamma sig+ sig- t-hat+ t-hat- CI+ CI- 
1 0.0046 0.0046 22.3958 22.3958 6.5378 37.6070 
1.05 0.0064 0.0033 21.9205 23.0265 4.8383 38.3035 
1.1 0.0086 0.0023 20.2757 23.7333 3.9420 39.9435 
1.15 0.0112 0.0016 19.3407 24.9133 3.2500 40.9040 
1.2 0.0144 0.0012 18.6250 25.4470 2.5085 41.2705 
1.25 0.0180 0.0008 17.5700 25.8310 1.7060 42.1385 
1.3 0.0223 0.0006 17.2682 26.8725 1.1810 42.3130 
1.35 0.0270 0.0004 16.6475 26.9280 -0.1650 43.7850 
1.4 0.0323 0.0003 15.6282 27.9705 -0.3600 44.9878 
1.45 0.0382 0.0002 15.1675 28.8250 -0.7245 45.1235 
1.5 0.0446 0.0001 14.6992 29.0870 -1.5400 45.7705 
1.55 0.0516 0.0001 14.1920 29.5300 -1.7500 46.3490 
1.6 0.0591 0.0001 14.1250 30.0080 -3.4740 47.4600 
1.65 0.0671 0.0001 13.7615 30.5533 -4.5168 48.2500 
1.7 0.0756 0.0000 12.9610 31.0425 -4.7468 49.5030 
1.75 0.0846 0.0000 12.3900 31.9550 -5.2220 52.2115 
1.8 0.0940 0.0000 11.6460 33.0183 -5.8520 52.5380 
1.85 0.1038 0.0000 11.4060 33.4400 -6.4715 52.5750 
1.9 0.1140 0.0000 11.0906 33.6817 -7.7435 52.5955 
1.95 0.1246 0.0000 10.9670 33.7328 -8.1450 52.6400 
2 0.1355 0.0000 10.7015 34.1119 -8.2188 52.9590 
* gamma: log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors.  
  sig+: upper bound significance level.  
sig-: lower bound significance level 
  t-hat+: upper bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate.  
  t-hat-: lower bound Hodges-Lehmann point estimate 
  CI+: upper bound confidence interval (a=0.95) 
  CI-: lower bound confidence interval (a= 0.95) 
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Figure 1. Household income and income from vegetables
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